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ORAL ARGUMENT REFORM IN UTAH’S APPELLATE COURTS:
SEEKING TO REVITALIZE ORAL ARGUMENT
THROUGH PROCEDURAL MODIFICATION
Clark Collings *
[I]t will be a sorry day for the American bar if the place of the oral
argument in our appellate courts is depreciated and oral advocacy
becomes looked upon as a pro forma exercise which, because of tradition
or because of the insistence of his client, a lawyer has to go through.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The modern institution of appellate oral argument has unfortunately arrived at
this “sorry day.” It has simultaneously been both devalued and tediously used as a
formalized relic of the past. This dual depreciation stems from two polarized
perspectives. One viewpoint is that oral argument is an antiquated and ineffective
tradition that should be completely replaced with written appellate argument.2
Supporters of this viewpoint cite the decreasing rate of oral argument in appellate
courts 3 and the general judicial perception of its irrelevance as evidence of the
institution’s imminent disappearance. 4 The opposing camp argues the reverse; it
attempts to preserve the tradition by returning to a format where appellate
argument is predominately oral—consistent with Great Britain and other common
law countries. 5 This group claims that the value of oral argument rests in a judicial
process that is visible and open to public scrutiny. 6 They further argue that this

* © 2013 Clark Collings. Special thanks to my wife, Jennifer, and her tireless
support. Many thanks to Daniel Medwed and Jared Tingey for their assistance in testing
my thesis. I would also like to thank the staff and executive editors of the Utah Law Review
for their contributions to this Note.
1
John M. Harlan, What Part Does the Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an
Appeal?, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 6, 11 (1955) (emphasis added).
2
See Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the
Conventional Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 n.14 (1986).
3
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.S-1 (2011), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf
(reporting that nearly 75% of the cases decided in 2010 in the United States Courts of
Appeals were decided without oral argument).
4
See Warren D. Wolfson, Oral Argument: Does It Matter?, 35 IND. L. REV. 451, 454
(2002) (estimating that only 5 to 10% of the remaining cases that are orally argued change
a judge’s mind).
5
See Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process, 89 IOWA
L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2004).
6
Martineau, supra note 2, at 11.
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policy goal cannot be achieved if judges are deciding cases by simply reading
briefs behind closed doors.
Although both camps make compelling arguments, the solution to the debate
does not lie within a counter-reform—a complete resurrection of oral argument in
every appeal 7—nor does it call for a complete extinction of the practice. Rather,
the solution can be found somewhere in the middle. Instead of focusing solely on
the preeminence of either oral or written argument, the courts should try to
effectively marry the two approaches to achieve optimal appellate review and
client advocacy. Appellate oral argument’s current procedural format is stuffy and
ineffective. What it is designed to accomplish is necessary, but the vehicle it uses
to achieve its purpose is outdated. As a result, it is becoming extinct in today’s
fast-paced appellate world. Therefore, the primary purpose of this Note is to
explore and prescribe several procedural reforms that are designed to revitalize the
institution and restore its purpose in the national appellate court system.
This Note proposes that the Utah appellate court system implement the
prescribed solutions as a preliminary test and set an example for the rest of the
nation. Part II of this Note will address the general purpose of oral argument,
outlining its benefits and the overall importance of the practice. Part III will
emphasize the negative impact of current appellate procedures on the judicial
process and the difficulties courts face when approaching oral argument. Part IV
will delineate the Utah state appellate court structure and how the current appellate
rules addressing oral argument are applied. Additionally, it will discuss the
progression of the current procedural rules governing oral argument in Utah and
will address the reasons why the Utah judicial system is an ideal laboratory to test
these modifications. Part V will explore and propose solutions to the problems
discussed in Parts III and IV. These solutions include a proposal to implement a
tentative-opinion program, a proposal to redesign the current format of oral
argument, and strategies to overcome confirmation bias among the judges. Lastly,
Part VI will briefly summarize the arguments and solutions discussed throughout
the Note.
II. THE PURPOSE OF ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellate oral argument is valuable and irreplaceable. Its primary purpose is
to achieve optimal client advocacy and judicial review. 8 All other benefits are byproducts of the process. The ultimate goal of bringing counsel before a panel of
judges is to give a litigant his day in court and to help that court arrive at a just
decision for that litigant. Judge Albert Tate Jr. believed that oral argument’s
“purpose is to assist and enlighten the court and if possible to incline the court to
7

Id. at 4 n.13 (“One federal judge has gone so far as to advocate making all appeals
discretionary in the courts of appeals so that oral argument can be held in every case.”).
8
Karl N. Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 627, 629
(1962) (“The job of an appellate argument is to win a particular case before a particular
tribunal, for a particular client.”).

176

UTAH LAW REVIEW ONLAW

[2013

give sympathetic consideration to the client’s view.” 9 Additionally, Justice Simeon
R. Acoba Jr. described oral argument as a “dialogue among the members of the
court and counsel, which . . . enlivens the written briefs, heightens [the court’s]
awareness of what is significant to the parties, and invigorates [its] analytical
senses.” 10 Oral argument goes hand in hand with written briefing. When oral
argument takes place without written briefs, the court is left unprepared to discuss
the issues. Likewise, written briefing without oral argument leaves the court with
unanswered questions. Although there is no constitutional right to oral argument, 11
its notion straddles the line of due process and equity. 12 In addition to its primary
purpose, oral argument produces a bounty of benefits that are vital to the judicial
process. These beneficial by-products are useful in defending the continued need
of oral argument in appellate review.13
Oral argument keeps the court’s doors open to the public, and thereby judges
are accountable to the public—not only for the decisions they make, but also for
the reasoning they employ to arrive at a decision. 14 In 1999, Justice Stanley Mosk
of the California Supreme Court published an article defending the importance of
oral argument. 15 In his article he discusses the public good that is served as a result
of hearing oral argument. 16 He states:
[Oral] argument and its subsequent reporting in the media enable
members of the public to hear and understand the contentions of the
conflicting litigants. Ordinary observers cannot be expected to seek out
the respective briefs, unless, of course, they have a peculiar or potential
financial interest in the result of the litigation. Nor must they be
expected in every instance to merely wait months for the ultimate
published opinion. 17

9

Albert Tate Jr., The Appellate Advocate and the Appellate Court, 13 LA. B.J. 107,
112 (1965).
10
Blair v. Harris, 45 P.3d 798, 808 (Haw. 2002) (Acoba, J., dissenting).
11
Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, ¶ 10, 110 P.3d 706 (“[O]ral
argument is a tool for assisting the appellate court in its decision making process, not an
independent due process right vested in the parties.”).
12
See Blair, 45 P.3d at 809 (“I believe the parties should be entitled to employ oral
advocacy in their efforts to persuade us . . . .”); Stanley Mosk, In Defense of Oral
Argument, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 25, 26 (1999) (“Primarily [oral argument] enables
the client—a member of the public—to have his point of view presented out in the open to
the reviewing court. He believes it is his right, and for that purpose he engages an attorney
to make his voice heard.”).
13
See Wolfson, supra note 4, at 454 (“There are other substantial benefits to oral
argument, aside from changing minds or making up minds. These other benefits more than
make the case for oral arguments.”).
14
See Mosk, supra note 12, at 27.
15
See id. at 25.
16
Id. at 26.
17
Id.
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Additionally, oral argument contributes to sound public policy because it
reminds the judges of the other players in the appeal and prevents them from
becoming “too isolated.” 18 Oral argument also provides a type of scholarly think
tank for counsel and the judges to predict unforeseen negative consequences of a
particular decision by addressing hypotheticals.19 Although the benefits cited
above are not the principal purpose of oral argument, they show that in addition to
client advocacy and appellate review, oral argument offers a diversity of benefits
that would be lost if it were completely abandoned. Justice William J. Brennan
summarized oral argument’s value when he concluded that “oral argument is the
absolutely indispensable ingredient of appellate advocacy. . . . [O]ften my whole
notion of what a case is about crystallizes at oral argument. This happens even
though I read the briefs before oral argument . . . .” 20 As a result, courts must
continue to strive to fulfill these purposes and retain these benefits by preserving
an effective form of oral argument through procedural modification. Failure to do
so has resulted in the weakened foundation of the institution, and opened the door
for critics to call for its demise.
III. WHEN PROCEDURE DILUTES PURPOSE
As the debate over the usefulness of oral argument continues, those who
demand its abolishment cite several drawbacks as evidence of its uselessness.
These criticisms, however, are only based in procedural weakness and do not strike
at the core purpose of oral argument. 21 Therefore, the weaknesses these critics
describe do not bolster their position that oral argument should be abolished;
rather, they show that oral argument only requires procedural modifications to
correct the problem. The following section discusses the most common
weaknesses and shortcomings attributed to oral argument.
The two most popular criticisms of oral argument are (1) that it takes too long
and (2) that the courts are too busy to expend judicial resources on such an activity.
The critics state, “[O]ral argument, even when reduced to only ten or fifteen
minutes per party, requires that judges and their staff travel to the court and sit
through the [proceedings].” 22 These critics further complain, “Oral argument also
requires the full attention of the judges and their staff to the cases being argued.
The criticism is that the judges and staff are then left without opportunity to attend

18

Martineau, supra note 2, at 13.
See Mosk, supra note 12, at 27 (“[S]killful interrogation of counsel from the bench
may reveal how a proposed legislative or judicial rule will actually perform in day-to-day
practice. This may often be accomplished by suggesting hypothetical circumstances or by
asking counsel to offer such possibilities.”).
20
HARVARD LAW SCH., OCCASIONAL PAMPHLET NO. 9, PROCEEDINGS IN HONOR OF
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN 22 (1967).
21
See discussion supra Part II.
22
Erick Rivero, Asylum and Oral Argument: The Judiciary in Immigration and the
Second Circuit Non-Argument Calendar, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1497, 1517 (2006).
19
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to any other matters during the course of an oral argument day.” 23 In connection
with the complaint regarding lack of time, critics mention large caseloads as
evidence of oral argument’s futility. 24
Utah appellate courts have dealt with the lack-of-time issue by rigidly limiting
time for oral argument. But the time limit creates problems of its own for
attorneys. Utah’s Practitioner’s Guide to Oral Argument describes the need for
haste in oral arguments by advising attorneys to be concise so as to not waste the
limited time they are granted for oral argument. 25 It almost seems as if the court is
rushing through the process in order to move on to other tasks. It is understandable
that the panel is busy and has many cases to review, but it is less understandable
that judges choose to be so formalistic as to shut their ears to a valid argument just
because the time ended. Additionally, if oral argument is truly important, why is
the panel so concerned with keeping to a rigid time allotment? Although engaging
in oral argument does require more time, like any meaningful endeavor, the
investor can expect a valuable return on his investment. Rosco Pound reflected this
same belief when he explained that “the rules limiting the time of argument
. . . suggest [an] attitude toward oral argument as something in which the bar are to
be indulged rather than as an effective aid to correct decision.”26
Oral argument is also criticized because the parties involved, the attorneys
and the judges, are imperfect beings that make mistakes. 27 For example, parties
often lose precious time during oral arguments because some judges have a
propensity to bully counsel or lead their argument astray with tangential lines of
questioning. 28 In some cases, judges focus on an unrelated issue or attempt to get

23

Id.
See Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and
Effects of Decision-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L. REV.
659, 661 (2007).
25
THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO ORAL
ARGUMENT BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 4 (2011), available
at http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/sup/forms/Practitioners_Guide_To_Oral_Argument.pdf
(“[T]he allotted time for argument is consumed quickly, especially when numerous
questions come from the Court. Counsel should be prepared to concisely present the
strongest or most significant elements of the case. . . . The Court encourages counsel to
submit the matter with time remaining if appropriate.”).
26
ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 370 (1941).
27
Roger Handberg, Judicial Accountability and Independence: Balancing
Incompatibles?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 127 (1994) (“[J]udges are not perfect, but only
human . . . .”); Jon Newberry, Nobody’s Perfeck: For Lawyers Who Think They Must
Always Be Invincible, Acknowledging an Error and Taking Corrective Action Go Hand in
Hand, A.B.A. J. Mar. 1996, at 70, 70 (1996) (“The best lawyers are not perfect, but they do
handle their mistakes well.”).
28
See Mosk, supra note 12, at 26 (providing an example of a California judge who
always interrupted lawyers at the beginning of their oral argument with certain questions
that inevitably distracted the lawyers from the substance of their arguments).
24
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the attorney to commit to unfavorable assertions about the case. 29 Justice Mosk
recalls a justice on the California Supreme Court “who would interrupt counsel’s
oral presentation at the outset with this critique: ‘Is your argument in your brief? If
so, there is no need to repeat it here. If it is not, why not?’” 30 Justice Mosk
continued: “The beleaguered counsel was then required to explain his technique
rather than to devote his limited time to the substance of his contention.”31 This
behavior is counterproductive. It wastes the lawyer’s, and most importantly, the
client’s valuable time. Furthermore, lawyers often spend months preparing for oral
argument only to be interrupted in the middle of their introduction by an
unexpected line of questions from a judge. 32
In connection with the judge’s shortcomings, another prevalent criticism and
drawback to today’s oral argument procedure is the panel’s own confirmation
bias. 33 According to Professor Alafair Burke, “[C]onfirmation bias is the tendency
of people, when they are testing the validity of a theory, to favor information that
confirms the theory over disconfirming information.” 34 For example, an appellate
judge may formulate a theory of the case and an inevitable decision as a result of
reading the briefs in preparation for oral argument. At oral argument, under the
confirmation bias theory, that particular judge may be prone to only ask questions
or look for arguments that support, rather than disconfirm, her view of the case. 35
Essentially, judges are not allowing oral argument to add anything to the
discussion because they have already made up their minds. A variety of judges
have confirmed this theory. Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert, appellate judge on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit believes:
29

Mark Hummels, Distributing Draft Decisions Before Oral Argument on Appeal:
Should the Court Tip Its Tentative Hand? The Case for Dissemination, 46 ARIZ. L. REV.
317, 317–19 (2004); see also Stephen M. Shapiro, Questions, Answers, and Prepared
Remarks, LITIG., Spring 1989, at 33, 36 (warning that appellate judges may engage in
extended debates with counsel over issues that are not central to the case and that advocates
must seek to avoid “becoming bogged down in intellectually stimulating digressions while
precious argument time ticks away”).
30
Mosk, supra note 12, at 26.
31
Id.
32
See Wolfson, supra note 4, at 455.
33
Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 512, 516 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias]. Other
culprits responsible for a judge’s inability to change his mind in oral argument could
include selective information processing, belief perseverance, and the avoidance of
cognitive dissonance; however, a discussion of these cognitive psychology studies is
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial
Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587
passim (2006) (discussing alternative possibilities to cognitive biases).
34
Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias, supra note 33, at 516 n.17 (citing PETER C.
WASON & PHILIP N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING: STRUCTURE &
CONTENT (1972)).
35
Cf. id. at 516–17 (applying the cognitive strategies to prosecutors rather
than judges).
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[W]hen I change . . . my mind at oral argument, more often than not it is
because the performance at argument did not meet the promise of the
brief. My mind was changed because the argument did not properly
defend the brief. The case was not won at oral argument; it was lost. 36
Additionally, a ten-month observation of Judge Richard S. Arnold of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that oral arguments failed to
change his mind in 131 out 157 cases. 37 Moreover, attorneys are beginning to see
the futility in arguing a case that is already decided in the minds of the judges. One
attorney’s sentiment reflected a general sense of discouragement when he said that
“most lawyers can count on the fingers of one hand the number of times oral
argument actually seemed to make a difference.”38 If judges do not find oral
argument useful and have firmly decided the case before hearing argument, why
continue the course? The solution, however, does not lay in abolishing oral
argument, but instead it must be found in removing the judge’s biases.
As mentioned above, attorneys are not without their fair share of the blame.
They have been accused of wasting argument time with poorly prepared
presentations. In some cases, attorneys seem uninterested, read verbatim from their
briefs, and repeat themselves constantly. 39 Furthermore, counsel has been accused
of mis-citing cases, arguing “weak, silly, or frivolous issues—which shouldn’t be
in the briefs in the first place,” 40 and sidestepping questions put forth by the
bench. 41 It is difficult for a court to reach an equitable decision in the appellatereview process when counsel is not fulfilling its end of the deal.
Given all of its human shortcomings, there is still value in oral argument. New
oral argument procedures are designed to free up the court’s docket and allow
frivolous appeals to be disposed of quickly and efficiently. The courts, having
devoted time and resources to make their dockets lighter and the process more
streamlined, have unfortunately all but abandoned the usefulness of appropriate
oral argument. Only meaningful procedural reform can return this lost value to the
court and allow oral argument to flourish again.

36

RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL
ARGUMENT 294 (1996).
37
Myron H. Bright & Richard S. Arnold, Oral Argument? It May Be Crucial!, A.B.A.
J., Sept. 1984, at 68, 68–70.
38
Robert E. Shapiro, Advance Sheet, LITIG., Summer 2001, at 59.
39
Wolfson, supra note 4, at 454.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 455.

NO. 1]

ORAL ARGUMENT REFORM IN UTAH’S APPELLATE COURTS

181

IV. UTAH: WHERE PROCEDURE CAN EMBRACE PURPOSE
A. The Utah Experiment
Utah offers the fertile legal landscape necessary to reform the broken oral
argument system. First, the Utah appellate court system carries a relatively smaller
caseload than most states with a similar population size. 42 In 2008, the total
number of appeals filed in both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals hovered close to 1,450. 43 Kansas, West Virginia, and Nevada—states with
roughly the same or smaller population size—had almost twice as many appeals
filed in their respective states in 2008. 44 As a result, the Utah state appellate system
is not overwhelmed by heavy caseloads like those states that use their workload as
justification for cutting back on oral argument. Second, Utah is fundamentally
open to allowing oral argument in its appeals. Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor
the Utah Court of Appeals requires litigants to formally request oral argument.
Thus both courts are structurally open to hearing oral argument on every appeal.
Furthermore, as of 2004, the Utah Supreme Court was one of only three state
supreme courts to automatically schedule oral argument in all cases. 45
Accordingly, Utah is well positioned to experiment with a procedural reform that
will assist its efforts to improve oral argument in its appellate courts.
B. Utah State Appellate Court Structure and the Application of Rule 29
To better understand both the potential effects of and the need for
implementing procedural modifications in the Utah appellate system, it is useful to
understand how the system is structured. Additionally, it is important to know how
Utah’s appellate procedure rules relating to oral argument are applied in its
appellate courts.
Currently Utah has two appellate courts, the Utah Supreme Court and the
Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Supreme Court is the state’s only “court of last
resort,” and it is responsible for all appeals relating to civil cases, capital and firstdegree felony cases, and all proceedings relating to the Judicial Conduct
Commission, attorney discipline, and constitutional questions. 46 The Utah Supreme
Court, consisting of five justices who serve ten-year terms, also has jurisdiction

42

See R. LAFOUNTAIN, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 2 (2010).
43
Id.
44
Id. (showing that Kansas had 2,742 incoming cases in its appellate courts, West
Virginia had 2,411, and Nevada had 2,248).
45
See DAVID B. ROTTMAN & SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 2004, at 151–54 tbl.26 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp
.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco04.pdf.
46
THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, UTAH’S APPELLATE COURTS (2007), available
at http://www.utcourts.gov/knowcts/docs/Appellate_Court_Brochure.pdf.

182

UTAH LAW REVIEW ONLAW

[2013

over the Utah Court of Appeals. 47 The Utah Court of Appeals was created in 1987
and consists of seven judges who serve six-year terms. 48 It is responsible for all
district court criminal appeals (excluding capital and first-degree felony cases),
domestic relationship appeals, and all juvenile court appeals. 49 It also hears any
other cases transferred to it from the Utah Supreme Court. 50
Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governs oral argument for
both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals. 51 Subsection (a) of
Rule 29 allows oral argument in all cases without a formal request, but it also gives
the courts the ability to deny oral argument in frivolous appeals, appeals where a
dispositive issue has been “recently authoritatively decided,” and in appeals where
“the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record
and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.” 52
Most recently, the Utah Court of Appeals has used this discretion and denied oral
argument in several cases.53 Subsection (c) outlines the “order of oral argument.” 54
This subsection reflects the rigid procedure present in most appellate courts
today. 55 Lastly, subsection (f) gives litigants the option to waive argument and
receive a decision on the submitted briefs.
Rule 29 has recently been amended to address the courts’ presumption of oral
argument. 56 The Advisory Committee Notes explain, “[T]he former practice was to
presume that argument was waived unless requested. The amendments change the
practice to presume that argument is requested unless expressly waived. The rule
incorporates the oral argument priority classification formerly found in the
administrative orders of the Supreme Court.”57 This is one reason why Utah is a
particularly ideal location for procedural reform. Unlike other jurisdictions that are
introducing rules that limit oral argument, Utah is expanding the right to oral
argument, thus reflecting the State’s willingness for further reform.
Even though Utah has amended Rule 29 to allow more oral arguments, its
procedural structure, like most appellate courts, is antiquated and seems to engage
in the process for traditional reasons. The appellate process in the Utah Supreme
Court and Utah Court of Appeals starts with the appellant filing a notice of appeal

47

Id.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
UTAH R. APP. P. 29.
52
Id. 29(a)(1)–(3).
53
See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Hughes, 2011 UT App 128, ¶ 1 n.2, 253 P.3d 1118.
54
UTAH R. APP. P. 29(c).
55
Id. (“The appellant shall argue first and the appellee shall respond. The appellant
may reply to the appellee’s argument if appellant reserved part of appellant’s time for this
purpose. Such argument in reply shall be limited to answering points made by appellee in
appellee’s oral argument.”).
56
UTAH R. APP. P. 29 advisory committee note.
57
Id.
48
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with the court no later than thirty days after the trial court’s judgment. 58 From
there, the parties file briefs and the trial court record is sent to the appellate court.59
Once the appellate court has these documents in its possession, oral argument is
heard, and thereafter the court issues an opinion to the lower court and to the
parties involved. 60 The mechanics of the oral argument format in the Utah
appellate courts are very similar to other courts across the country. It is formalistic
and fairly brief. The Utah Supreme Court hears cases on the first Tuesday,
Wednesday, and Thursday of every month, excluding January, July, and August. 61
It allows each party twenty minutes to address the court, totaling forty minutes per
session. 62 The Utah Court of Appeals hears arguments in the Matheson
Courthouse, usually in the last two weeks of every month, excluding July and
December. 63 This court usually hears two to three arguments a day. 64 It also
encourages counsel to be well prepared for “the presentation and judicial dialogue
that constitute oral argument.”65 The court allows each party fifteen minutes to
address the court, totaling thirty minutes per session. 66 In both the Utah Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals these time requirements are strictly followed and kept
by a timer on counsel’s podium. 67 Similarly, the remaining procedures are
followed in both courts. As is the tradition with all appellate courts, the appellant
argues first and is allowed to allocate a portion of his time for rebuttal.68 Thereafter
the appellee argues, and then the appellant engages in his rebuttal. 69 If time
concludes as counsel is explaining a legal theory or argument, he must stop
immediately. 70 The Utah State Judiciary has even stated, “[T]he allotted time for
argument is consumed quickly, especially when numerous questions come from
the Court. Counsel should be prepared to concisely present the strongest or most
significant elements of the case. . . . The Court encourages counsel to submit the
matter with time remaining if appropriate.”71 The Utah rules openly accept the
value of oral argument, but simultaneously undercut that value by limiting its use
in the execution of the rule.
58

UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a).
THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 46; UTAH R. APP. P. 12(b).
60
See THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 46.
61
THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO ORAL ARGUMENT
BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 1 (2011).
62
Id. at 3.
63
Id. at 1.
64
Id. at 3.
65
Id. at 2.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 4; THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 25, at 4.
68
See THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61, at 3; THE ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE COURTS, supra note 25, at 3.
69
See THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61, at 4; THE ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE COURTS, supra note 25, at 3–4.
70
THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61, at 4; THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE COURTS, supra note 25, at 4.
71
THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61, at 4.
59
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V. PROPOSAL FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM
The failures described above strengthen the argument that the solution is
modification, not abolishment. 72 This section proposes several procedural
strategies that can remedy the problems described in Part III. These proposals can
either be taken as a whole or taken piecemeal; regardless, they will have a positive
effect on the overall quality of oral argument in Utah and the national appellate
system.
A. Tentative Opinions Issued Before Oral Argument
An effective way to curb tangential lines of questioning from aggressive
judges, to better prepare the litigants, and to narrow the focus of discussion in oral
argument is for the court to circulate a tentative opinion among all the parties
before argument takes place. A draft decision or tentative-opinion program is not
new to state appellate practice or even to the justice system in general. Although it
has not yet been used in the Utah appellate system or on the federal appellate level,
it has been implemented in both the Arizona Court of Appeals and the California
Court of Appeals with great success. 73 Furthermore, prior to its implementation in
these state appellate courts, many state trial courts and administrative courts had
employed this process to improve the quality of counsel’s arguments.74 In essence,
a tentative-opinion program is a type of reverse briefing whereby the court reveals
where it stands prior to oral argument.
1. The Arizona Model
In 1982, the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, was the first appellate
system in the country to implement the tentative-draft distribution procedure.75
Under the Arizona model, once oral argument is scheduled for an appeal, the
process takes the following four-step procedure. First, after the panel of judges has
read the parties’ briefs, an assigned judge prepares a draft opinion asserting his
own decision of the case. 76 The author of this tentative opinion is not revealed to

72

See discussion supra Part III.
See Hummels, supra note 29, at 329–38.
74
Id. at 320 (citing People v. Hayes, 802 P.2d 376, 419 (Cal. 1990)); Philip M. Saeta,
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the parties. 77 Second, the assigned judge then circulates the draft opinion among
the other judges on the panel with an opportunity to informally discuss the case
and come to a tentative meeting of the minds. 78 This informal discussion, however,
does not constitute an official vote and thus the draft decision is still the initial
view of the author. 79 Third, the court notifies the parties of the scheduled date and
time for oral argument and that a draft opinion is available.80 Fourth, after
receiving this notice, litigants have ten days to alert the court that they do not want
the tentative opinion distributed.81 Finally, if all parties agree to the dissemination
of the opinion, the draft is distributed to the parties for use in preparation for oral
argument seven to ten days prior to the scheduled date of oral argument. 82
The beauty of the Arizona draft opinion procedure is that it is informal and
“not followed rigidly in all cases.”83 This allows the judges some flexibility and to
adapt to the changing needs of each case. 84 For example, sometimes a judge
assigned to draft an opinion is unable to finish before the assigned oral argument
date. In such a case, the court can continue without draft distribution or it can
reschedule the oral argument to allow for the completion of the draft. 85 This loose
approach to the procedure gives the court the ability, in the event of a full docket,
to dispense with the draft distribution and to continue on with the scheduled cases.
When procedure becomes more important than the goal it aims to achieve, the
court system finds itself engaging in counterproductive behavior. The Arizona
approach solves that problem.
Moreover, the Arizona draft opinion procedure allows the attorneys involved
in the appeal to know what issues are important to the panel. It also helps them
tailor their presentation to resolve any concerns the judges might have.
Additionally, the draft opinion permits the attorneys to clarify any erroneous
assumptions the panel might have in regard to their case.86 As noted above, the
Arizona draft opinion distribution procedure has been successful and welcomed by
judges and attorneys. In 1987, the court initiated an informal study to measure the
overall reception and effectiveness of the process.87 The study found that the draft
opinion procedure
1) made oral argument more useful for both counsel and the court by
ensuring that judges were better prepared for argument and by focusing
the attention of judges and advocates on the significant issues in the case;
77
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2) gave counsel an opportunity to clarify perceived errors of fact or law
in the draft, at a time when the court was viewed to be more responsive
to such suggestions than it would be during a motion for reconsideration
after a decision; and 3) served to keep the judges and their staff “on
track” with their caseload by establishing an “artificial deadline” for draft
rulings before argument, and by enabling panels of judges to move
quickly to a final opinion or memorandum immediately following oral
argument. 88
Accordingly, the benefits and flexibility that the Arizona model provides can help
Utah reshape its approach to oral argument and help make it relevant again.
2. The California Model
The California model also provides a unique approach to oral argument
procedure, and if coupled with some of the pieces of the Arizona model, it could
offer a more polished approach that will improve oral arguments. In 1990, about a
decade after Arizona initiated its draft opinion procedure, the California Court of
Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, followed suit.89 The idea arose
out of a need to improve oral argument and make it more useful to the parties
involved. 90 The challenge in California was that, like Utah, parties are granted oral
argument by right, and thus the court hears oral argument in almost all cases.91 The
court needed to take a different approach to handle the amount of arguments it was
hearing. The court enacted a model similar in some respects to Arizona’s model,
but the California model interjects new procedures to remedy specific problems
within its jurisdiction.
One major divergence from the Arizona plan is that California requires a vote
by all judges on the panel of its draft opinions, whereas Arizona only requires an
informal conference.92 As a result of the vote, the draft becomes a “tentative
opinion” rather than a “draft opinion.”93 Another difference in the California
approach is the notice given to parties in regard to the tentative opinion. After the
judges have voted on the tentative opinion, it is mailed to the parties with an
“oral argument waiver notice” usually one to two months prior to the scheduled
oral argument. 94
Like the Arizona model, the California model has been well received and has
been effective in accomplishing its purposes. According to Justice Thomas E.
Hollenhorst, one of the justices responsible for fashioning the California model,
the tentative-opinion program made oral argument more useful to the court and to
88
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counsel. 95 In regard to counsel’s response to the program, Justice Hollenhorst said,
“In both civil and criminal matters, counsel almost always reported great benefit in
planning their strategy for oral argument and deciding which issues to concede and
which to pursue.” 96 The most dramatic effect the California model has had on oral
argument is the way counsel’s presentations now play before the judges.
Traditionally, counsel sparred with one another, attacking each other’s arguments
from the briefs. Conversely, under the tentative-opinion program, an early winner
and loser have already been determined, and thus “[c]ounsel no longer argue
against each other but become proponents or opponents of the tentative decision
draft.” 97 This paradigm shift has resulted in more lively debates during oral
argument, and “[w]here counsel raise[s] legitimate concerns about the contents of
the tentative opinion, the court, rather than becoming embroiled in a defense of it,
defers to the opposing counsel to respond to the concerns.”98 Accordingly, the
issues are crystalized for all the parties and a productive forum is created, rather
than a formalistic setting where little is accomplished.
Lastly, in 2004, the California Supreme Court issued an opinion discussing
whether the tentative-opinion program in Division Two violated the parties’ right
“to oral argument on appeal in California.”99 The court held that the practice was
permissible but warned against the use of the waiver sheet, concerned that it could
discourage litigants from pursuing oral argument. 100 Overall, the court was pleased
with the program, stating, “We applaud innovations, such as the tentative opinion
program adopted by the Court of Appeal here, that are initiated to maintain the
quality and integrity of the judicial process in spite of [courts’ increasing caseloads
and financial constraints].” 101 The tentative-opinion program is still only used in
division two and has yet to spread to other divisions within the fourth district.
3. Tentative Opinion Proposal for Utah
The Utah appellate court system and its oral argument procedure would
benefit greatly from implementing a tentative-opinion program. The proposed
program should reflect the basic structure of the Arizona model with some of the
alterations of the California model. Additionally, new provisions should be
included to expand on the successes that California and Arizona have experienced.
The proposed Utah model should operate under a three-step process. First,
after briefs have been submitted and oral argument has been requested in either the
Utah Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court, a judge on the assigned panel
hearing the argument will be randomly selected to write a draft decision. Second,
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as in the California model, after the completion of the draft, the other judges on the
panel will review the draft, contribute feedback, and vote as to whether it reflects
the mind of the court. If all the judges agree, the draft decision will then become a
tentative opinion. Although it may take longer to draft and to vote on, the tentative
opinion provides counsel a better prospective of where the entire panel of judges
stand in regard to the case. 102 Under Arizona’s draft-decision model, counsel may
be misled to believe that the entire panel is in conformity with the draft and may
address arguments only pertinent to one judge, thus causing oral argument to be
lopsided and ineffective. Moreover, when counsel is aware of the entire panel’s
position, it may reconsider a certain approach or abandon seeking oral argument
altogether. 103 Thus, dedicating time early in the process to produce a tentative
opinion better prepares the judges and counsel for oral argument, and as a result it
lays a foundation for oral argument to be more efficient and effective. Finally,
using a tentative-opinion approach over a draft opinion may save time in that it
may help reduce the number of frivolous and unwarranted oral arguments that
continue forward. In a sense, it is better to spend a dime now to save a dollar later.
Third, after the completion of the panel’s vote, the litigants are notified by e-mail
of the date and time scheduled for oral argument and that a tentative opinion is
available for distribution pending acceptance by both parties. Both the appellant
and appellee will then have ten days to opt out of the program. If neither party
sends correspondence within the ten days, the panel will disseminate the tentative
opinion—ideally between fourteen and twenty-one days prior to oral argument.
The above proposal assumes that each member of the panel of judges will
agree on the preliminary draft decision and that the three-step process can be
accomplished in a reasonable time—avoiding a backlog in the court’s calendar. In
the event that problems occur, the proposed Utah model will default to the flexible
approach adopted by Arizona. 104 The court can either postpone oral argument or
dispense entirely with the tentative opinion. 105 What the Utah model will do
differently, however, is that it will still require some kind of communication from
the panel to the litigants prior to oral argument. This communication could be the
draft opinion with disclaimers that it only contains one judge’s opinion. It could
also be a type of interrogatory, addressing questions that the judges may ask in oral
argument. 106 The purpose of this portion of the proposal is to eliminate the element
of surprise during oral argument and to give counsel some direction while
preparing. Time and disagreement among judges are not the only potential
drawbacks to the proposed Utah model; however, additional drawbacks will likely
be overcome by including flexible and simple procedural additions.
Another popular criticism of the tentative-opinion program among reluctant
courts is the “judges' concern with opening their internal ‘work product’ to public
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inspection.” 107 This hesitation can be overcome by scheduling an opportunity for
counsel to read the tentative opinion in camera. Under this approach, courts would
require attorneys to review draft opinions in the judge’s chambers under a
specified time limit. If these courts are still uncomfortable with such transparency,
at the very least, the court can still engage in a process of distributing
questionnaires prior to oral argument in an effort to refine issues at the hearing.
A related criticism is the potential reluctance to change the draft opinion once
it has been formulated, much like cognitive bias or “front loading.” Judge
Hollenhorst addressed this issue by explaining “that the same arguments about the
court becoming locked into a position in a tentative decision can also be made after
the use of traditional oral argument and release of an opinion which for some
reason has been shown to be erroneous.” 108 Furthermore, as explained above, the
judges are also prone to this weakness after their initial reading of the briefs or
during their preparation for oral argument. Thus, concluding that tentative opinions
are tainted because of a judge’s unwillingness to change his mind is unfounded
because judges are prone to do this with or without an established tentative-opinion
program in place. A solution to this judicial shortcoming will be addressed in the
next section.
Consequently, a tentative-decision program gives direction to oral argument
by inviting the attorneys to point out flaws in the tentative opinions. These
opinions are described as “targets,” at which the parties are encouraged to take
careful aim. 109 The tentative-opinion process keeps judges conscientious of their
work and provides transparency to the public. The procedural development of a
tentative-opinion program in Utah will refine the judge’s line of questioning and
better prepare counsel for the process of presenting the client’s case to the court.
As a result, oral argument will improve, and more equitable decisions will
be reached.
B. Restructuring the Procedural Format of Oral Argument
In addition to providing an indication of what the court will likely discuss at
oral argument, a wholesale procedural format change will further help revitalize
the judicial process. Implementing a conference model, rather than the rigid model
currently in place, will make the conversation between the judges and counsel less
formal and more productive. Judges actually prefer the conference model, and it
brings a greater sense of organization to the conversation between the advocate and
the panel. Former Deputy Solicitor General Stephen M. Shapiro believes “most
appellate courts [and] the Justices of the Supreme Court view . . . [oral] argument,
not as an occasion for speeches or a game of 20 questions, but rather as an initial
conference convened to decide the case.”110 He also asserts that “Counsel is invited
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into the conference for two purposes: to serve as a resource, providing information
needed to clarify the thinking of the Justices; and to bring an organizing theme,
emphasis, and a note of drama needed to marshal the information in a meaningful
way.” 111
Instead of following an arcane format of judges sitting in elevated benches,
the Utah appellate courts should implement a format similar to that used at
congressional committee hearings. 112 Under this format, all the parties, including
the panel of judges, will sit at level tables facing one another. While seated,
attorneys will each receive two to five uninterrupted minutes to summarize their
position. Thereafter, each judge will have at least ten minutes to question each
attorney. 113 If additional time is required for either counsel or the panel, an
extension should be granted liberally. 114 During this questioning process, counsel
can address one another, and a conversation will take place among all the parties—
rather than a rushed and interrupted show of oratory skill. At the end of the
question-and-answer period, the parties will be dismissed and the oral argument
will be officially over. 115
Another common law rule that can be implemented allows for a more open
discussion at oral argument by giving the parties the option to address new
arguments not addressed in their briefs. According to Yee v. City of Escondido, 116
“Once a federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in
support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made
below.” 117 Implementing this rule will make oral argument less dependent on the
written briefs and more open to a fluid conversation of the legal issues. Justice
Mosk, discussing this notion, stated, “[N]ot infrequently oral argument develops a
new issue overlooked or not adequately briefed. This gives the court an
opportunity to instruct counsel to prepare supplemental briefing during a specified
period.” 118 As a result, no stone will be left unturned, and oral argument will be
better equipped to help the court render a just decision. This format will
completely change the atmosphere at oral argument. Judges will no longer be able
to interrupt counsel with frivolous questions, and attorneys will be required to
111
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come prepared to discuss the pertinent merits of the appeal. An actual conversation
will occur between the panel and the attorneys, and the court will engage in a
thorough analysis of the law.
C. Judicial “Debiasing Strategies”119
One procedural modification that will free the judges from confirmation bias
and contribute to a more useful oral argument discussion is the application of a
cognitive filter test to the appellate review process. This solution solves a key
criticism of the tentative-decision program. As described above, confirmation bias
is the cognitive process of only favoring information that supports a particular
theory or belief, rather than accepting information that may disconfirm that
previously held belief. 120 This cognitive limitation may affect a judge’s ability to
objectively use information received at oral argument in deciding the appeal.
Professor Alafair Burke proposed a test that assists criminal prosecutors in
removing their confirmation bias, and as a result decreases the number of wrongful
convictions. 121 This same test can be applied to judges as they embark in the
appellate review process, especially as they approach oral argument.
1. Professor Burke’s Prosecutorial Debiasing Strategies
The core component of Professor Burke’s proposal is to enact noninvasive
reform that neither requires cumbersome implementation nor carries with it bags of
controversy. 122 Her proposal is nimble and puts the responsibility of
implementation on the prosecutors.123 This intuitive approach may be the best way
to initiate reform; however, it requires the judges, individually or collectively as a
panel, to implement the following four debiasing strategies. 124
The first strategy Professor Burke proposes is a simple plan of education.125
Evidence shows that learning about the dangers of confirmation bias contributes to
mitigating its harmful effects.126 This can be accomplished relatively easily by
requiring periodic training. 127 Evidence also suggests, however, that education
alone cannot overcome confirmation bias, and therefore it must be united with
other strategies. 128
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Second, Professor Burke proposes an individual devil’s advocate system
where prosecutors are “forced to articulate arguments that contradict their existing
beliefs.” 129 Research reveals that “induced counterargument” combined with
exposure to opposing viewpoints help to remove confirmation bias.130
The third debiasing strategy revolves around internal reviews. Since relying
solely on oneself to see a different perspective might fail due to a lack of effort or
an overwhelmingly strong confirmation bias, Professor Burke suggests using
others who are less invested in a particular outcome to help in the decision making
process. 131 This process is basically a form of the devil’s advocate strategy, but
instead of being one’s own devil’s advocate, another noninvested individual
provides a “fresh look.” 132 This conversation can take place formally or informally
depending on the importance of the case. 133 In either alternative, this form of
confirmation debiasing confronts individuals holding the bias and forces them to
reconsider their stance. Through this internal review, another layer of redundancy
is inserted to assist the prosecutor in his effort to remove the bias.
The last proposed strategy revolves around a system of “external
transparency.” 134 This strategy interjects the last line of defense against
confirmation bias. Where education is susceptible to lack of attention, and devil’s
advocate exercises with an uninvolved individual are prone to groupthink, this
strategy of opening up to others’ scrutiny will force individuals with confirmation
bias to rethink their position. Professor Burke suggests that external transparency
can consist of advisory “fresh look” committees, which are operated by civilians
“permitting outsiders such as judges, civil practitioners, and defense attorneys to
review their discretionary conduct.”135 Although this may be the most
controversial layer in the defense against confirmation bias, the proposal is up to
the prosecutors to decide and implement, which allows them to choose an external
check that is reasonable to their circumstances.
2. Judicial Debiasing Strategies for the Utah Appellate System
Although Professor Burke created her proposal with criminal prosecutors in
mind, the principles are applicable to judges engaged in appellate review. Before
the substantive applicability is discussed, it is important to note that Professor
Burke’s notion of nimble reform is procedurally applicable as well. These
strategies can quickly be initiated if the judges themselves take the responsibility to
implement them, thereby avoiding cumbersome and controversial steps that would
involve the state legislature. Concerning Professor Burke’s first education strategy,
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judges could schedule a monthly or quarterly training seminar where the effects of
confirmation bias are discussed. This should be easy to implement because most
state bar requirements already call for some kind of continuing education course.
This confirmation bias training could be incorporated into that schedule.
The devil’s advocate strategy is already informally in place in most appellate
courts. The process of oral argument itself is a forum for judges to confront
opposing viewpoints. This process is not sufficient, however, 136 and additional
lines of defense should be built. One possible strategy, related to Professor Burke’s
second recommendation, is to require the judge to argue more heavily and ask
questions against his previously held viewpoint during oral argument. Regarding
the tentative-opinion program, the court could require an alternate judge to write a
tentative dissenting memorandum opinion in an effort to present the panel with a
different outlook on the case. The court could invite judges that are not assigned to
the case to provide feedback that would take place in either formal or informal
meetings. Additionally, the revised format for oral argument proposed above
would lend itself to a more open discussion among the judges and the attorneys,
and in turn, it would be a more effective type of devil’s advocacy than the
original format.
Finally, the court could implement external transparencies in an effort to
eliminate confirmation bias. The tentative-opinion program offers a viable strategy
in this category. By allowing counsel to see the court’s tentative opinions, the
judges are forced to explain their positions using facts, and when combined with
the other strategies above, they will be more aware of their propensity to allow
confirmation bias to influence their decision. At the other extreme, the court could
organize a panel of local practitioners to review a judge’s suspected confirmation
biases by comparing tentative opinions with discussions at oral argument and the
ultimate decision in the case. These committees would be completely advisory,
much like the committees used in Professor Burke’s example, and would be used
in situations where the court itself institutes the committee by invitation. Applying
any of the above strategies will breed a culture that is aware of the dangers
of confirmation bias and is able to remove that bias from judicial
decisions. Consequently, oral argument will become more useful and relevant for
everyone involved.
VI. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the current institution of oral argument in the national and Utah
appellate court systems must be revitalized to save a legal practice that has
positively contributed to the development of the law. The purposes served by oral
argument—client advocacy and equitable appellate review—cannot be lost merely
because the procedure is outdated. By implementing a tentative-opinion program,
oral argument will be more focused and meaningful. By reformatting the
procedural logistics of oral argument, the parties will be uninhibited in their
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approach to the conversation. Finally, by employing judicial debiasing strategies,
the judges will be aware of their confirmation bias propensities and, as a result,
will arrive at better decisions. The Utah appellate process will be reinvigorated and
will avoid the “sorry day” when oral argument becomes meaningless.

